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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2627
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1476
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 4713
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 4748
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7699
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2685
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 5407
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9375
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7857
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3094
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 3179
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 3064
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 3374
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 2424
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 2319
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 3078
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAHLG/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0198
RHMFISS/HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

Tuesday, 18 April 2006, 07:08
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 12 NEW DELHI 002587
SIPDIS

SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, DS/IP/ITA AND DS/IP/SA
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TAGS PTER, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PINS, MASS, KJUS, KTIA, TBIO,
KCRM, TINT, EFIN, EAIR, SNAR, KISL, IN, PK, BK, NE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR APRIL 19 US-INDIA CT JOINT WORKING
GROUP

REF: A. NEW DELHI 2446 B. NEW DELHI 2361 C. NEW DELHI 2291 D. NEW DELHI 2229 E. NEW DELHI 2119 F. NEW DELHI 1632 G. NEW DELHI 1611 H. NE
Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

11. (C) Summary: The US-India counterterrorism dialogue reflects our shared values and encompasses the range of CT issues in South Asia. New De
12. (C) Since the August 2004 CTJWG, the GOI has moved forward with counterterrorism legislation and policy, including on terrorist finance and
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into force in October; there is room here too for improvement. Top GOI officials have publicly expressed their strong interest in India becomin
13. (C) Since the last CTJWG a host of bilateral interactions, including disaster cooperation (the December 2004 tsunami and the October 2005 e
CT Bureaucrats

14. (S) The MEA has the lead on international CT cooperation, with Additional Secretary (International Organizations) KC Singh the GOI's interl
SIPDIS (vice the rest of the Indian bureaucracy, which dramatically shifts portfolios every few years), is worth pursuing in areas within their
Threat Assessment: Priority on Jihadis

15. (C) Terrorism conducted by jihadi groups based in Pakistan -- and sometimes with the support of elements of the GOP -- is historically the
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substantially decreased from 2001-2004 (approximately 20% decrease each year), according to Indian government statistics and a leading independ

16. (C) Kashmiri terrorist groups made numerous attacks on elected Indian and Kashmiri politicians, targeted civilians in public areas, and att
Threat Assessment: Naxals a Rising Threat

17. (SBU) Indian terrorism analysts -- in some respects more so than the GOI -- are concerned that Naxal terrorism, which covers a broad regio
18. (SBU) Naxal groups often target Indian security forces vice civilians. However, in West Bengal, they have targeted members of the state rul
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annually in recent years. The two primary Naxalite groups in 2004 combined to form the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist); this construct
19. (SBU) In September 2005, the Indian Home Ministry and the senior elected and bureaucratic officials from the 12 Naxal-affected states (Andh
Threat Assessment: Northeast Terrorism Not a GOI Priority

110. (SBU) Terrorism in India's Northeast states (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, and Meghalaya) consists of mar
Why the GOI Focuses on the Jihadis

111. (C) The GOI does not focus on Naxalite or Northeast terrorism with the intensity it devotes to jihadi terrorists, probably for a combinati
-- Attacks by Naxalites and Northeast groups remain confined to rural areas far from New Delhi.
-- The Naxals generally target security forces vice civilians.
-- The Naxals lack external support, which makes them a purely Indian problem, something the GOI cannot blame on other countries; the GOI blame
-- Because Naxalites and Northeast groups are treated as domestic issues, they are largely handled by the individual
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states in which these groups operate. The GOI over the past year has tried to tie together the anti-Naxal efforts of the "Naxal-affected states
-- The most likely solutions to the problems posed by the Naxal and Northeast groups involve improving local/state governance and economic oppo
Extraterritorial Dimensions of Terrorism in India

112. (C) Pakistan: The prominent place jihadi terrorism plays in India's threat perception is a significant irritant in Indo-Pakistan relations
113. (C) Bangladesh: The GOI for years has insisted that Northeast terrorist groups and, more recently, Pakistani jihadi groups maintain bases

114. (C) Nepal: As noted above, the GOI does not believe that domestic Naxals and Nepalese Maoists maintain any significant operational links,
115. (C) The GOI also regularly tells us that Kathmandu, including the airport, has become an operations hub for Pakistan's Inter-Services Inte
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Delhi's complaints on this matter.
Bioterrorism not on Delhi's Radar ...

116. (C) Few Indians -- GOI, think-tanks, etc. -- are concerned about bioterrorism (Septel). They generally view it as an over-the-horizon issu
117. (C) Controls at bio-tech facilities are weak to non-existent, making India's large industrial capacity a potential source of hazardous bic
... Nor is WMD Terrorism

118. (C) Many of the same factors at play within the GOI and terrorist groups active in India regarding bio-terrorism also relate to WMD terror
Cyber-Terrorism

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119. (C) Cyber-security, by contrast, is an increasing source of Indian concern and focus. India hosts a significant number of high-tech profes
120. (C) The National Security Council Secretariat is the lead agency on cybersecurity and cyber-terrorism, and The Mission's NSCS interlocutor
Waging the "Battle of Ideas"

121. (C) We can learn a great deal from India's management of its large society to minimize extremist ideologies. India enjoys a democratic, mu
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plagued India for decades, or when provoked by regional politicians for their narrow political purposes (for example, the recently passed anti-

122. (C) Mission India executes robust and forward leaning programming designed to counter extremist ideologies (Ref O). We provide numerous e
Terrorist Finance and Anti-Money Laundering Legislation

123. (SBU) India's Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), which came into effect in July 2005, allows for the freezing, confiscation and se
124. (SBU) The PMLA also aims to combat money laundering in India and allows for confiscation and seizure of the property obtained from launder
125. (SBU) Top GOI officials have publicly expressed their strong interest in India becoming a member of the Egmont Group and the Financial Act
Airline/Airport Security and Anti-Hijacking Policy

126. (C) We have significant gaps in our understanding of how
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far the GOI has come in operationalizing its new anti-hijacking policy since it was unveiled in August 2005 (Ref P). Our understanding, based c
-- More specifics on how the GOI will accommodate foreign aircraft, including if a foreign plane is hijacked while in Indian airspace.
-- What additional equipment or training Indian entities will require, and if there are opportunities for USG training and American firms.
-- How first responders will prioritize between timeliness and chain-of-command in trying to make difficult decisions.

127. (SBU) The recent launch of two direct Delhi-US flights (Continental and American) and the expected announcement of several more such route
ATA Training

128. (SBU) Forensics is weak in India -- only two DNA labs service the entire country. Few police officers outside major cities are trained in

129. (SBU) India is a voracious consumer of ATA training, having digested 42 courses involving 900 Indian security officials and accepting some NEW DELHI 00002587 010 OF 012 to be doing effectively (Ref E). Other encouraging news is that course graduates include officers who have since been promoted to senior ranks Information/Intelligence Sharing: Lost/Stolen Passports

130. (SBU) The GOI has heretofore been reluctant in sharing its database of lost and stolen passports with INTERPOL, a move which would greatly Information/Intelligence Sharing: Investigations

131. (SBU) While RSO's liaison with the Indian police is adequate, there is room for improvement. The Indian bureaucracy stalls many investigat Information/Intelligence Sharing: Tactical Threat Reporting

132. (S/NF) RSO sends the majority of threat information investigative requests to the New Delhi Police Department's Special Cell, which is the 133. (S/NF) RSO has found that the sharing of tactical threat information with Delhi police is woefully lacking. RSO and the Emergency Action C NEW DELHI 00002587 011 OF 012
GOI, to date unsuccessfully, to establish a liaison position that would serve as a real-time clearinghouse for threat information and coordinat
134. (SBU) As noted above, much CT activity happens at the state level. India's lack of a national crime database seriously inhibits CT analysi MLAT Implementation

135. (SBU) The US-India MLAT came into effect in October 2005. In November, the USG requested GOI assistance under MLAT regarding a joint DEA-I Other Issues the GOI May Raise

136. (C) IC-814: Repeated GOI demarches last year seeking information on the December 1999 IC-814 hijackers suggest that some CT interlocutors
137. (C) Dawood Ibrahim: Mumbai crime boss and Specially Designated Global Terrorist Dawood Ibrahim is wanted by Indian police for having planr NEW DELHI 00002587 012 OF 012
Hotel in Dubai, and was the more recent rubbing of salt in this festering sore (Ref R).
138. (C) The "List of 20": The prior (Vajpayee) government had sent to Islamabad a request to extradite twenty terrorists and criminals that me Comment: Opportunity to Move Ahead

139. (C) This JWG offers an opportunity much like the July 18 agreement to set ambitious goals and strive to meet them. The challenge is to bui